(no subject)

[jackofallgeeks]

If Ethics is your thing (I'm thinking notably of Daniel and Nifer), I'd be facinated to know what your thoughts on These are.

Comments

[bsgnome.livejournal.com]

...

7. The boy clearly can't swim, yet the man on the bridge can, and he know's that it would take little effort on his own part to save the boy. To ignore the boy, and think "not my problem," is to condemn the boy to die. By his inaction, he has killed the boy. The reason that this obligation should not be legal is because there is no practical manner in which such a law could be justly enforced; often, the only one who can be certain of a person's capability to save another is that person themself.

8. Unlike the above, here we have a group of incompotent's. They know they are incapable of helping the assailled, and so, they don't. Though it was in bad taste for them to video-tape the crime and make fun of the victim, it was not criminal.

9. Tom is guilty on account of his action, Joe on account of inaction. Witholding the antidote from his wife is just as bad as poisoning her in the first place. The difference between this and the man above who let the boy drown is that here, Joe was not only capable of saving his wife, but the fact that he was so capable is clear to anyone who examines the evidence. Whether Joe can give his wife the antidote is not so hard to prove as whether passer-by Jim is capable of, not only swimming, but properly keeping another body afloat, so as not to drown them in the attempted rescue.

10. I'm uncertain on this question. My difficulty is in seeing why or why not tortue could or could not be justified. The situation seems extreme enough, so it could be justified. That this is a subjunctive phrase is key, it may be that toruture is never justified, I'm not sure. In either case, it would not be justifiable to torture his innocent wife.

11. The job of a psychiatrist, or therapist, is to be a confidant and advisor, and through sessions, lead the patient to come to reasonable solutions to his problems (at least, such is my understanding). If, by some law, a patient cannot trust that what he says in confidance will not be divulged, then the necessary relationship is undermined, and the intended result cannot be achieved. For this reason, the professional confidentiality should be (almost?) as inviolable as the Seal of Confession which Catholic priests are bound by. Though, inaction, on the part of the psychiatrist, is not the answer, through consultation, he should calm the impulses of the patient, and lead him away from the intention of killing.

12. On the one hand, "the job should go to the most qualified aplicant." On the other hand, Jim knows his friend, and he knows he can trust him, et cetera. It is not a matter of "loyalty to friends," but of knowledge of the applicant. Jim knows things about his friend which were not mentioned in the resume or touched upon in an interview. The stranger may be technically more qualified, but, he remains a stranger, and, more or less, a "wild card." The fact of the matter is, it's an open option, choosing either would be justifiable.

13. On the one hand, an innocent man is in danger of paying for my friends crime. On the other hand, I promised my secrecy. To keep my promise, I cooperate in an injustice. To break my promise, I seem to commit a breach of trust. However, the promise was made outside the circumstances of the trial. Circumstances have changed, and the promise, if kept, will cause more harm than good (though what good this promise could have been for is dubious). It is wrong of my friend to let the innocent man take his place, and it would be cruel of my friend to force me to allow this injustice. He should not have told me in the first place, but now that he has, he must accept that, in these circumstances, I need testify.

14. The person and their rank is irrelevant. The law is irrelevant. The legislator is not exempt, et cetera. No one is above the law. It cannot be expressed any clearer than that.

Just a couple of points.

[jackofallgeeks.livejournal.com]

1. The man was responsible for the deaths of the people he forced off the boat; whether he would have been responsible if other choices were made is irrelevant. I even think that having no good choices is irrelevant: he still did what he did. On top of that, the action he made, while well reasoned, was made as an individual against the expressed will of the others; perhaps he would be less accountable if all in the boat had agreed to an action (and perhapse not), but that's not the question posed.

2. One can not predict the future, and ought not made decisions based on such unpredictable measures. Perhapse he kills another man anyways, regardless of you pulling the chair or not; now you've killed your son for no good at all. It is better to act as an individual to the best you can; whether this man kills more people is not under your control.

[bsgnome.livejournal.com]

2. I'm drawing here a connection between the hypothetical "me" and an executioner. The executioner, who acts on the command of a just authority, obtains no responsibility for his action of execution--e.g. a man is condemned to death, the executioner need not worry about whether or not the man is guilty, because the man's blood is not technically on his hands, but those of the one in authority.

In retrospect, though, I'm not exactly sure this connection can be drawn. The question comes to whether or not the authority an opposing force has over POWs is just, and then whether this authority's jurisdiction extends to capital punishment.