John Noble (![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png)
jackofallgeeks) wrote2005-12-12 07:28 pm
jackofallgeeks) wrote2005-12-12 07:28 pm(no subject)
If Ethics is your thing (I'm thinking notably of Daniel and Nifer), I'd be facinated to know what your thoughts on These are.
jackofallgeeks) wrote2005-12-12 07:28 pm
no subject
1. I said above "not guilty." I'm not sure if I can really hold to that answer. But, I'm not sure if I could hold to the answer of guilty either. On the one hand, were nothing done, everyone would have died, and he would be responsible for those deaths, by his inaction, since something could have been done. The lifeboat was designed for 7 (if I recall correctly), yet they overloaded it. Due to the storm, under such conditions, the lifeboat could not have done anyone good. The solution was to lighten the load (unfortunately, this load consists entirely of people). On the other, he did directly force innocent people into the ocean. Now, I believe that the man was right in deciding that it would be better to save some, than to save none; however, I cannot agree with his decision to force the weak off. It may be true that the only hope for survival was in hard-rowing, but, on the same count, it is also true that the strongest have the best chance for survival sans boat (addmittedly, even for them, such a chance is near non-existent). The best option, I believe, would have been for him to inform everyone of the exact situation, and either have people voluntarily abandon, or draw lots. In this way, the chance for survival, of each, is the same, and none are automatically condemned for being of "less use."
2. I said "pull the chair." On the one hand, I am making myself an instrumental cause of my sons death. On the other hand, by doing so, I am possibly saving another man's life. Now, I don't see myself as weighing lives in this situation, since I know that, regardless, my son will die. If I choose to be my son's executioner, the innocent man may live; otherwise, the innocent man will die. Either way, my son dies. Now, as to whether I'd be as blameless as an executioner, I'm not sure; that falls under the question of authority, and jurisdiction, et cetera and what not. These, I'm not prepared to deal with.
3. She did the right thing to choose. That's that. Now, as to her "guilt" and subsequent suicide. I don't know if suicide can be morally justified, and I don't want to wrestle with that. If she truly felt guilty, what does that mean, did she think it'd've been better had she not chosen at all, and allowed for both of her children to die? If so, she should not have felt guilty, for her choice to choose was correct. Did she think it'd've been better had she chosen her daughter to live? That's entirely "what if" thinking, it never helps anything; besides, there was no "right" choice between son and daughter--you can't weigh lives. If neither of the above, then what she felt was not guilt, or regret, but mere remorse for having been forced to make such a choice.
4. There's no way around it, they can't use the dynamite without directly killing the fat man, so they can't use the dynamite. It's irrelevant that high tide will be coming soon. As said, the fat man got stuck, so he can get unstuck.
5. This is an avoidable death. Whenever possible, death should be avoided. This death should be avoided. The financial/sconomic cost is irrelevant. The tunnel was not a mistake, even though it was known that a number of deaths would be likely in its construction, because of the benefit it serves to the community. Though recognized as likely, the deaths are certainly not intended.
6. Unlike the others, this is not a matter of life, but of truth and justice. It would not only be deceitful of Valjean to let an innocent man pay for his crime, it would be unjust. As to whether or not the punishment is just is irrelevant to this question, it is not Valjean's place to decide, by inaction, that an innocent man will take his place. As to whether or not people working in his factory will suffer due to his imprisonment is also irrelevant. He committed the crime, so he should admit to it, and pay the price.
Continued ...
no subject
7. The boy clearly can't swim, yet the man on the bridge can, and he know's that it would take little effort on his own part to save the boy. To ignore the boy, and think "not my problem," is to condemn the boy to die. By his inaction, he has killed the boy. The reason that this obligation should not be legal is because there is no practical manner in which such a law could be justly enforced; often, the only one who can be certain of a person's capability to save another is that person themself.
8. Unlike the above, here we have a group of incompotent's. They know they are incapable of helping the assailled, and so, they don't. Though it was in bad taste for them to video-tape the crime and make fun of the victim, it was not criminal.
9. Tom is guilty on account of his action, Joe on account of inaction. Witholding the antidote from his wife is just as bad as poisoning her in the first place. The difference between this and the man above who let the boy drown is that here, Joe was not only capable of saving his wife, but the fact that he was so capable is clear to anyone who examines the evidence. Whether Joe can give his wife the antidote is not so hard to prove as whether passer-by Jim is capable of, not only swimming, but properly keeping another body afloat, so as not to drown them in the attempted rescue.
10. I'm uncertain on this question. My difficulty is in seeing why or why not tortue could or could not be justified. The situation seems extreme enough, so it could be justified. That this is a subjunctive phrase is key, it may be that toruture is never justified, I'm not sure. In either case, it would not be justifiable to torture his innocent wife.
11. The job of a psychiatrist, or therapist, is to be a confidant and advisor, and through sessions, lead the patient to come to reasonable solutions to his problems (at least, such is my understanding). If, by some law, a patient cannot trust that what he says in confidance will not be divulged, then the necessary relationship is undermined, and the intended result cannot be achieved. For this reason, the professional confidentiality should be (almost?) as inviolable as the Seal of Confession which Catholic priests are bound by. Though, inaction, on the part of the psychiatrist, is not the answer, through consultation, he should calm the impulses of the patient, and lead him away from the intention of killing.
12. On the one hand, "the job should go to the most qualified aplicant." On the other hand, Jim knows his friend, and he knows he can trust him, et cetera. It is not a matter of "loyalty to friends," but of knowledge of the applicant. Jim knows things about his friend which were not mentioned in the resume or touched upon in an interview. The stranger may be technically more qualified, but, he remains a stranger, and, more or less, a "wild card." The fact of the matter is, it's an open option, choosing either would be justifiable.
13. On the one hand, an innocent man is in danger of paying for my friends crime. On the other hand, I promised my secrecy. To keep my promise, I cooperate in an injustice. To break my promise, I seem to commit a breach of trust. However, the promise was made outside the circumstances of the trial. Circumstances have changed, and the promise, if kept, will cause more harm than good (though what good this promise could have been for is dubious). It is wrong of my friend to let the innocent man take his place, and it would be cruel of my friend to force me to allow this injustice. He should not have told me in the first place, but now that he has, he must accept that, in these circumstances, I need testify.
14. The person and their rank is irrelevant. The law is irrelevant. The legislator is not exempt, et cetera. No one is above the law. It cannot be expressed any clearer than that.
Just a couple of points.
2. One can not predict the future, and ought not made decisions based on such unpredictable measures. Perhapse he kills another man anyways, regardless of you pulling the chair or not; now you've killed your son for no good at all. It is better to act as an individual to the best you can; whether this man kills more people is not under your control.
no subject
In retrospect, though, I'm not exactly sure this connection can be drawn. The question comes to whether or not the authority an opposing force has over POWs is just, and then whether this authority's jurisdiction extends to capital punishment.